Hidden Schooling: Repeated Grades and the Returns to Education and Experience by Kennedy, Kendall
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Hidden Schooling: Repeated Grades and
the Returns to Education and Experience
Kendall Kennedy
Mississippi State University
31 October 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/90454/
MPRA Paper No. 90454, posted 14 December 2018 11:30 UTC
Hidden Schooling: Repeated Grades and the Returns to
Education and Experience
Kendall J. Kennedy∗
October 31, 2018
Abstract
Over the past four decades, nearly 25% of all American public school students re-
peated at least one grade in primary or secondary school, and ninth grade repeating
increased four-fold. Despite its prevalence, few economists have attempted to account
for grade repeating when estimating the returns to education and experience. I show
that 10% of the increase in ninth grade repeating was caused by changes in compulsory
schooling laws (CSLs). Because CSLs increase both grade repeating and educational
attainment, compulsory education-based IV estimates of the returns to education are
positively biased by up to 38%. Additionally, grade repeating causes endogenous mea-
surement error in labor market experience. Solely through this measurement error, I
show that the residual black-white wage gap is overstated by 10%, the wage return to
a high school diploma is overstated by 11% relative to dropouts, and the labor supply
gap between dropouts and high school graduates is overstated by 23%. Controlling for
age instead of experience reduces this bias, suggesting age should be a standard control
variable for reduced-form analysis, not experience.
∗kkennedy@business.msstate.edu; The author thanks Philip Oreopoulos for providing a list of compulsory
schooling laws in the United States. This research was conducted with restricted access to Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) data. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the BLS.
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1 Introduction
Grade repeating in elementary and secondary school is surprisingly common in the United
States; the NLSY97 reports that 23% of Americans born in the early 1980s repeated at least
one grade at some point in their academic career. Even more surprising is which grades are
being repeated. 50 years ago, grade repeating was almost exclusive to Kindergarten and the
1st grade, but from the 1980s to today, researchers (Haney et al., 2004; Heubert and Hauser,
1998; Planty et al., 2009) estimate the annual 9th grade retention rate at between 5 and 15%
per year in each year.
This sudden rise in 9th grade retention has largely been ignored by the economics lit-
erature, but its effects are potentially quite problematic. 9th grade retention, and grade
retention in general, is unobserved in many popular microdata sets, and not reported by de-
fault in any popular microdata set. This means that estimation of the returns to education is
incomplete, omitting any effects of repeated grades. Instrumental variables estimation using
compulsory schooling instruments is particularly affected by this issue, as compulsory school-
ing laws are one of the primary causes behind the rise in 9th grade repeating. In addition,
the typical measures of labor market experience face large and potentially endogenous mea-
surement error when failing to account for grade repeating in any grade. The most common
measure of labor market experience is a simple proxy, Age− Educational Attainment− 6.
For grade repeaters, however, this measure does not correctly state the number of years a
person has been out of school, because educational attainment does not include repeated
grades. Thus, failure to account for repeated grades in calculating experience can create
bias in other estimates, if repeating rates are correlated with the variable of interest.
In this study, I examine how repeated grades, particularly in the 9th grade, affect es-
timation when controlling for educational attainment and labor market experience, even
when education and experience are not of primary interest to the researcher. I show that
2
instrumental variables estimates using quarter of birth and/or compulsory schooling law
instruments are biased by up to 38% when failing to account for 9th grade repeating. Fur-
thermore, I show that estimates of the residual black-white wage gap are overstated by 10%
when failing to account for repeated grades in the measure of labor market experience. The
wage gap between GED recipients and high school graduates is overstated by 18% and the
employment gap is overstated by 34% when failing to account for repeated grades.
I first construct a set of 9th grade repeating rate estimates using state-level enrollment
data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), and compare these esti-
mates to administrative data on repeating rates, as well as to another potential repeating
rate estimate from the Current Population Survey (CPS) October Supplement. I then move
to an examination of compulsory schooling laws. Compulsory schooling laws (CSLs) have
been both directly (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000; Lochner and Moretti, 2004) and indirectly
(e.g. quarter of birth as in Angrist and Krueger 1991) used as exogenous sources of variation
in estimating the returns to education. I demonstrate that increases in CSLs from 1965 to
2014 caused a 0.7 percentage point increase in the annual 9th grade retention rate; changes
in CSLs are responsible for approximately 11% of 9th grade retention in the United States
over the past 50 years.
Since 9th grade retention is closely tied to educational attainment, omission of 9th grade
retention from IV estimation of the returns to education can cause substantial selection bias.
Using the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (CNLSY), I examine
the interactions between compulsory schooling and 9th grade repeating in IV estimation of
the private returns to education. Using only CSLs as instruments causes an 8% positive bias
in the wage return to education, but using quarter of birth instruments causes a 38% positive
bias in the wage return to education. Moreover, these are lower bounds for the selection bias
caused by failing to account for endogenous 9th grade repeating, as weak instruments cause
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upward bias in the corrected IV estimates.
Education and experience are two of the most popular controls in studies using individual-
level data, but both of these are mismeasured in the presence of repeated grades and can
introduce considerable bias. By default, nearly all popular datasets define “Education” as
educational attainment, which is the highest level of education an individual completed.1
Failing to account for repeated grades in measurement of education has the potential to
create bias if repeated grades have a non-zero return. More concerning, however, is the
measurement of experience; typically, experience is replaced by a proxy “Potential Experi-
ence” variable, calculated as Age−Educational Attainment− 6.2 This experience measure
overstates the true level of “potential experience” for grade repeaters, meaning that if the
primary variable of interest is correlated with grade repeating, the inclusion of “potential
experience” as a control introduces endogeneity into the model.
Using the NLSY97, I estimate the bias caused by mismeasurement of potential labor
market experience in two areas of interest – estimation of the residual black-white wage gap
(as in Bound and Freeman 1992) and estimation of the returns to a GED (as in Cameron and
Heckman 1993). Black students are 2.5 times as likely as white students to repeat grades; I
show that for early career male workers, the residual black-white wage gap is overstated by
10% when failing to account for repeated grades. GED recipients are 3.5 times as likely as
high school graduates to repeat grades; I show that the wage return to a GED is understated
by 18%, relative to a high school diploma, and the employment gap, measured by annual
hours worked, for GED recipients is overstated by 34%, relative to a high school diploma
when failing to account for repeated grades.
1The US Census, the American Community Survey (ACS), the Current Population Survey (CPS), the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and many
others report educational attainment as the default education variable.
2When actual labor market experience is observed, researchers conventionally still use this potential
experience proxy. Observed labor market experience (e.g. lifetime weeks worked) is highly endogenous, as
it is directly caused by labor force participation and employment decisions. (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989)
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These findings have wide-reaching implications. 9th grade repeating is endogenous with
compulsory schooling instruments, suggesting a need to revisit previous IV estimation of the
returns of education, both for labor market outcomes such as wages and employment and
for non-labor market outcomes such as crime and health. Studies controlling for education,
and particularly for experience, need to be cognizant of the prevalence of grade repeating in
the United States. The typical measure of experience used in the economics literature faces
substantial measurement error, that has an incredibly high potential to introduce endogene-
ity.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains how repeated grades
bias estimation of the returns to education and experience. Section 3 discusses the data
sources used in this study. Section 4 describes the construction of estimates and presents
stylized facts for the 9th grade repeating rate over the past 50 years. Section 5 presents
theory and results regarding 9th grade repeating and compulsory schooling instruments.
Section 6 presents results from estimation of the residual black-white wage gap and returns
to the GED using a corrected measure of potential labor market experience, and provides a
discussion of potential solutions to mismeasurement of labor market experience. Section 7
provides concluding remarks.
2 Repeated Grades Bias
2.1 Compulsory Schooling as Instrumental Variables
Compuslory schooling laws are generally considered an exogenous source of variation for
educational attainment, making them a prime candidate for instrumental variables estima-
tion of the returns to education. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) use years of compulsory
schooling, calculated as the minimum dropout age minus the mandatory school entry age, as
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an IV in the estimation of the private and external wage returns to education. In addition,
they use quarter of birth as an alternate set of instruments, similar to Angrist and Krueger
(1991), which operate on the same margin; both CSLs and quarter of birth affect the age
and grade at which a teenager can legally drop out of school. A teenager facing a minimum
dropout age of 16 would historically be expected to drop out around the 10th grade; de-
pending on their quarter of birth, this teenager may drop out before, during, or after the
10th grade. Both of the aforementioned studies estimated the effects of education on wages;
other studies have used CSLs as instruments in estimating the effects of education on crime
(Lochner and Moretti, 2004), health and happiness (Oreopoulos, 2007a), employment and
poverty status (Oreopoulos, 2007b), and many other outcomes.
9th grade repeating causes two issues with the IV estimate of the returns to education:
first, the IV’s effect on educational attainment is weakened by 9th grade repeating. CSLs
may not cause 9th grade repeaters to increase their educational attainment; they instead
repeat the 9th grade, meaning that CSLs are more likely to face weak instrument bias in
the presence of 9th grade repeating. Second, and more concerning, if there is any return
to repeating the 9th grade, CSLs are invalid instruments. To illustrate this, consider the
following simple form of a 2SLS estimation of the returns to education:
Ed Attainmenti = α0 + α1CSLi + λXi + ui (1)
Yi = β0 + β1 ̂Ed Attainmenti + ΓXi + εi (2)
If 9th grade repeating has an effect on the outcome Yi and is endogenous with CSLs,
then the correct regression model is instead:
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Ed Attainmenti =α0 + α1CSLi + λXi + ui
Repeat 9thi =δ0 + δ1CSLi + ΩXi + vi
(3)
Yi = β0 + β1 ̂Ed Attainmenti + β2 ̂Repeat 9thi + ΓXi + εi (4)
If the IV is exogenous to 9th grade repeating, then 2SLS estimation of equations 1 and 2
will return a consistent estimate of the return to educational attainment, even if 9th grade
repeating has a return to the outcome being tested. However, in Section 5.1 I demonstrate
that changes in compulsory education cause a 0.7 percentage point increase in 9th grade
repeating. This may appear to be a small change, but the 1st stage regression in equation
1 typically returns an estimate in the range of 0.07 to 0.1. This suggests that no more than
7-10% of the population increases their educational attainment as a result of CSLs, and that
the effect on 9th grade repeating is within an order of magnitude of the effect on educational
attainment.3
In IV estimation, the bias caused by omission of an endogenous variable has the potential
to be quite large, particularly if the 1st stage estimate is weak or small. The IV estimate of
the returns to education in the presence of endogenous 9th grade repeating, as in equations
1 and 2, can be expressed as:
βˆIV1 =
d̂Y
dCSL̂dEdAttainment
dCSL
p−→β1
dEdAttainment
dCSL
+ β2
dRepeat9th
dCSL
dEdAttainment
dCSL
=
β1 ∗ α1 + β2 dRepeat9thdCSL
α1
(5)
Equation 5 provides a clear illustration of the selection bias caused by 9th grade repeating;
given that the 1st stage point estimate αˆ1 is only between 0.07 and 0.1, even a small effect
3A smaller percentage of the population increases their educational attainment due to CSLs if some
increase their attainment by more than 1 grade.
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of repeating the 9th grade (β2) would cause massive selection bias – 10-14 times as large
as β2 × dRepeat9thdCSL . This bias is entirely unique from the typical concerns with CSLs as IVs
– that they are weak instruments (Bound et al., 1995) and that they are only estimating
a local average treatment effect (LATE) (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Instead, 9th grade
repeating causes selection bias due to the CSL instrument being endogenous in the second
stage regression. In Section 4 I show that 9th grade repeating did not become prevalent
until the mid-1980s. Thus, this is less of a concern for studies using older data. However,
any modern study is susceptible to CSLs being invalid instruments.
2.2 Repeated Grades and Potential Labor Market Experience
Repeating any grade, not just the 9th grade, can cause severe, endogenous measurement
error in estimating the returns to experience. Labor market experience, strictly defined,
should be measured as the lifetime number of hours or weeks worked. However, this measure
is highly endogenous, as selection into labor force participation and employment is correlated
with numerous unobservable characteristics (e.g. Eckstein and Wolpin 1989). Most economic
studies are not interested in a precise estimate of the returns to experience, instead wishing
to control for potential endogeneity of labor market experience with the other variables of
interest in the model. To control for experience without introducing the selection bias from
labor force participation and employment, conventionally researchers use a “potential expe-
rience” proxy variable, calculated as Age− Educational Attainment− 6.
The intuition behind this potential experience proxy is readily apparent. An individual’s
potential labor market experience is the number of years of their adult life that they have
not been in school; a 30 year old college graduate has 30 − 16 − 6 = 8 years of potential
labor market experience, while a 30 year old high school graduate has 30 − 12 − 6 = 12
years of potential labor market experience. However, in the presence of repeated grades,
this intuition fails. A 30 year old high school graduate who repeated a grade is measured
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as having 12 years of potential labor market experience, but in reality they only have 11
years of their adult life that they were not in school, having graduated from high school a
year later than their peers.4 If grade repeating is correlated with the variable of interest,
then measurement error in this potential experience proxy variable biases the primary es-
timate of interest, as labor market experience is systematically overstated for grade repeaters.
3 Data
3.1 Aggregate Repeating Rate Analysis
I compile a dataset of state-level 9th grade retention rates for analyzing recent trends in
repeating and for demonstrating the endogeneity of compulsory schooling laws with 9th grade
repeating. For this, my main data source is the National Center for Education Statistics’
(NCES) Annual Reports Program Historical Tables on elementary and secondary enrollment.
This provides enrollment counts in each grade, Kindergarten to 12th grade, from 1965 to
2003. I link this with the NCES’s Elementary/Secondary Information System (ELSi) from
2003 to 2014 to form a complete panel of state-level enrollment by grade from the 1965-66
school year to the 2013-14 school year. For analysis on compulsory schooling, I use a list
of compuslory schooling law changes from 1965 to 2005 from Oreopoulos (2006). This is
combined with changes from 2003-2014 taken from Mackey and Duncan (2013), and verified
with information from The Education Commission of the States.
Data directly measuring repeating rates are generally nonexistent. However, there are
two incomplete sources of data that I use to verify the validity of my repeating rate estimates.
4Early and late entry into elementary school cause similar measurement error to repeated grades. If early
and late entry are correlated with the primary variable of interest, this measurement error is also endogenous.
My analysis avoids this issue by directly observing the year each individual completes their schooling, but
other analysis should follow the recommendations I suggest in Section 6.3.
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First is a list of repeating rates reported in Heubert and Hauser (1998). These repeating
rates are reported for 27 states in various years from 1979 to 1997 – there are only 81 obser-
vations in this dataset, meaning each state reports repeating rates an average of 3 times. I
combine this with data from the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education from 1998-2012 to form a dataset of 97 observations of state-reported 9th grade
repeating rates with which I can compare my estimates. I additionally compare my estimated
repeating rates with the Current Population Survey’s (CPS) October Education Supplement.
3.2 Returns to Education and Experience
I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) and the Children of
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (CNLSY), as these are two of the only
microdata sets in which I can observe grade repeating. The NLSY97 surveyed 8,984 12
to 18 year olds in 1997 and reinterviewed them every year from 1997 to 2011, after which
the survey became biennial. Importantly, the initial survey included an educational history,
which included grade enrollment by year. I use this history, along with grade enrollment by
survey year, to construct measures of repeating for the 9th grade and for any grade. I also
observe a full employment history including wages, employment status, hours worked, and
weeks worked. Following Bound and Freeman (1992), I omit individuals who do not have an
ASVAB test score. The CNLSY is a continuation of the NLSY79, which surveyed the children
of women in the originial NLSY79 sample. This sample includes 11,521 individuals born
between 1970 and today, and includes the educational history and labor market outcomes
of these individuals. I restrict my sample to only include individuals who had completed
their education by the most recent survey in 2014, the youngest individuals in my sample
were born in 1997. These public-use data are then merged with NLSY restricted geocodes,
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for determination of the compulsory schooling
laws each individual faced. Summary statistics for all data are provided in Table 1.
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Panel A of Table 1 shows summary statistics for enrollment changes. My preferred
estimates of the annual 9th grade retention rate, the 8th to 9th grade enrollment change
and the 9th to 10th grade enrollment change, are on average 6% across states and years,
1965-2013. In less than 5% of the sample, the 8th to 9th grade enrollment change is negative
and the 9th to 10th grade enrollment change is positive – these are omitted from my analysis.
Panel B describes the CNLSY used in analysis of compulsory schooling laws. The CNLSY
oversamples black individuals; they account for 34% of the observations. The average level
of compulsory attendance is about 11 years, and the average educational attainment is 12.3
years. The CNLSY only identifies which individuals ever repeated the 9th grade; as a result,
I am unable to identify individuals who repeated more than once. Panel C describes the
NLSY97 sample used in analysis of black-white gaps and the returns to the GED. Here, I
can observe all grade repeating, as well as individuals who repeated multiple grades. About
4% of the sample repeated the 9th grade at least once, and 24% of the sample repeated any
grade.5 Finally, Panel D describes the frequency of different minimum dropout ages from
1965 to 2014. Dropout ages below 16 are extremely rare, only occurring in two states (MS
from 1979-93, AR from 1977-80). The most common minimum dropout age is 16, with 18
becoming more popular; 24 states had a minimum dropout age of 18 in 2014, compared with
only 4 in 1965.
4 9th Grade Repeating Rates
4.1 Estimation
Administrative and nationally representative survey data on grade repeating rates are
generally quite rare. At the national level, Haney et al. (2004) use enrollment data from
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to examine attrition between grades,
5The mean of 9th grade repeats is about 5%, because 0.7% of the sample repeated the 9th grade multiple
times. 6.6% of the sample repeated multiple grades.
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that is, students who do not proceed normally to the next grade due to retention or drop-
ping out, from the 1960s to 2000s. They show that the average attrition rate between the
9th and 10th grades grew from about 3% in the late 1960s to 12% in 2000. The attrition
rate between the 9th and 10th grades can be approximated as 9th grade retention rate +
9th grade dropout rate − 10th grade retention rate.6 They do not directly compare the
attrition rate to 9th grade retention rates, but suggest a rise in 9th grade retention as the
predominant cause of this attrition change. In contrast, Hauser et al. (2007) use the Current
Population Survey (CPS) to assemble annual repeating rate estimates for the United States
– they claim that annual 9th grade retention rates were only between 2.2% and 4.2% from
1995 to 2005. State-level retention rates are rarely available, with administrative data coming
from a study by the National Research Council (NRC) in 1999, as well as from the Mas-
sachusetts Department of Education (MADoE). In this section, I fill this gap in the literature
by assembling a state-level panel dataset of 9th grade repeating rate estimates, and testing
their accuracy against the highly incomplete, but otherwise accurate administrative data to
determine the proper dataset for use in this study and in future work on 9th grade repeating.7
I assemble state-level repeating estimates from the two sources used in Haney et al. (2004)
and Hauser et al. (2007): the NCES enrollment data and the CPS October Education sup-
plement. The NCES data come from two programs – enrollment by grade (1st-12th) and
state from 1965-2003 is from the NCES Annual Reports Program Historical Tables, and en-
rollment by grade and state from 2004-2014 is from the NCES Common Core of Data. These
enrollment counts only cover public schools, which make up over 90% of all students in the
United States. Although these enrollment data do not directly measure 9th grade retention
6The 9th to 10th grade attrition rate can also be affected by movement between private and public schools,
death rates, and immigration, but these are have much smaller effects than retention and dropouts.
7Smaller-scale studies of 9th grade retention have used nationally representative survey data in a limited
number of years (Planty et al., 2009) or analysis of school district-level data on repeating (Allensworth and
Easton 2005 and many others). These estimates are generally in the 5-15% range, are likely more accurate
than my cohort-level enrollment-based estimates, but are available for far fewer years or are not suited for
analysis of national trends.
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rates, the growth in enrollment between 8th and 9th grades and the attrition between 9th
and 10th grades may be reasonable estimates of retention.
Due to the repeated survey structure of the CPS, it provides a direct measure of 9th
grade repeating rates. I first restrict my sample to only include individuals enrolled in the
9th grade in the first year they were surveyed. I then observed their grade in the second
year they are surveyed; 9th grade repeaters are enrolled in the 9th grade in both years.8 I
then average these 9th grade repeating rates within each state-year pair to assemble a panel
dataset of 9th grade repeating rates from 1976-2016.
For the NCES and CPS estimates to be valid estimates of the true 9th grade repeating
rate, they should be highly correlated with and similar in magnitude to the true rate. To
begin, I examine the correlations between the NCES and CPS estimates of the 9th grade
repeating rates and the true 9th grade repeating rates from the NRC and Massachusetts
DoE. Correlations and p-values from the test H0 : ρ = 0 are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2 clearly shows a weak correlation between the CPS estimate and the true re-
peating rates from the NRC and MA, while showing strong correlations for the enrollment
change estimates from the NCES, particularly for the 9th-10th grade enrollment change.
While none of these estimates show perfect correlation with the 9th grade repeating rate,
the NCES estimates are potentially valid, but noisy, measures of the true 9th grade repeating
rate. However, these correlation tests do not verify that these estimates are comparable in
magnitude to the true 9th grade repeating rate, only that annual and between-state varia-
8Some 9th graders observed for the first time may already be repeaters. However, if the CPS is a valid
dataset for 9th grade repeating analysis, the proportion of individuals who were already 9th grade repeaters
in the first year surveyed would represent the proportion of the 9th grade population who are repeaters for
a given state-year pair. Those who repeat the 9th grade for a 2nd time should be representative of the
population that repeats the 9th grade more than once.
9All correlations and regressions impose that the 8th to 9th grade enrollment change is non-negative and
the 9th to 10th grade change is non-positive. For the <5% of observations violating these assumptions, the
enrollment change is set to 0.
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tion is proportionate. To test similarity in magnitude, I perform a series of OLS regressions
without constants. A valid estimate of the 9th grade repeating rate will have a high R2 and
a coefficient estimate near 1.10
Table 3 shows results from regressions of the true 9th grade repeating rates from the
NRC and MA on my 9th grade repeating rate estimates. Columns (1) and (2) show similar
results – the NCES estimate is 12-14% larger than the true 9th grade repeating rate on
average, but shows a high R2, the 9th grade to 10th grade change explains nearly 75% of
the variation in the true 9th grade repeating rate. Column (3) shows the CPS estimate is
24% smaller than the true 9th grade repeating rate on average, and explains substantially
less variation in the true repeating rate than the enrollment change estimates. Column (4)
presents an alternative way to rank these estimates – the 9th-10th grade enrollment change
explains the majority of the variation in the true repeating rates, the 8th-9th grade change
explains a smaller portion of the variation, and the CPS estimate has no explanatory power
in comparison to the other two estimates.11 Given that the R2 in column (4) is only slightly
larger than in column (1), the 9th-10th grade enrollment change appears to be a strong
estimate of the true 9th grade repeating rate, while the 8th-9th grade enrollment change is
a still a meaningful, but noisier estimate.
4.2 Stylized Facts
From Table 1, the average 9th grade repeating rate in a US state from 1965-2014 was
about 8% per year. However, the 9th grade repeating rate has not been stable over time.
Figure 1 shows enrollment by grade for the 1977 and 2014 graduation cohorts, for all public
10The R2 from a regression without a constant is not directly comparable to the R2 from regressions with a
constant, as imposing the point (0, 0) in the regression modifies the interpretation of residuals. Nevertheless,
in comparing three models without constants, R2 provides a meaningful basis on which I can rank the validity
of my estimates.
11The 8th-9th grade enrollment change and 9th-10th grade enrollment change are highly collinear (ρ =
0.66), so the relative magnitudes of these two point estimates may be inaccurate.
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school students in the United States.12 The 1977 cohort in Graph (a), who entered the 1st
grade in 1965 and were in the 9th grade in the 1973-74 academic year, is representative of
historical enrollment patterns in the United States. The 1st grade is substantially larger than
the 2nd grade, as many students are retained in early elementary education for non-academic
reasons, i.e. to aid in their social and behavioral development. Enrollment is relatively stable
from the 2nd grade until high school, with minor fluctuations between grades and a small
increase in 9th grade enrollment relative to 8th grade enrollment. Then, enrollment drops
from the 9th to 12th grades, as students are legally allowed to drop out of school – usually,
around age 16 in the mid-1970s.
The 2014 cohort in Graph (b) shows a markedly different pattern. 1st grade enrollment
is no longer substantially larger than 2nd grade – this is likely due to the growing popularity
of Kindergarten; socially and behaviorally underdeveloped children now are likely to repeat
Kindergarten, not the 1st grade. As in the 1970s, enrollment is stable in elementary and
middle school. However, the 9th grade is substantially larger than the 8th grade, or any other
grade for the 2014 cohort; There are over 350,000 more 9th graders in the 2010-11 academic
year than 8th graders in the 2009-10 academic year (9.7% larger), and over 250,000 more 9th
graders in 2010-11 than 10th graders in 2011-12 (6.8% larger). The decline in high school is
not as steep for the 2014 cohort as for the 1977 cohort, due to higher compulsory schooling
requirements and increased graduation rates over the past 50 years.
Figure 2 shows the 9th grade repeating rate estimates calculated in Section 4.1 from
1965-2014. The top line shows the 8th-9th grade enrollment change estimate, and the bot-
tom line shows the 9th-10th grade enrollment change estimate. These two estimates are not
exactly equal in magnitude, the 8th-9th grade change is generally 1 to 2 percentage points
larger than the 9th to 10th grade change, but the pattern is highly symmetric. Taking the
12According to Kena et al. (2016), 90.3% of all US Elementary and Secondary students are enrolled in
public schools.
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9th-10th grade change as the preferred estimate of the 9th grade repeating rate, from 1965
to the early 1980s the 9th grade repeating rate was 2-5% per year. In the 1980s, the rate
grew dramatically, reaching a peak of 11.4% in 1998, then rapidly declined after 2003. The
center line shows the enrollment change from 8th to 10th grade; this shows no discernible
trend and is generally near 0, verifying that the estimated growth in 9th grade repeating is
not caused by immigration, moving from private to public school, or changes in dropouts
in the 9th or 10th grades. If the estimated growth in 9th grade repeating were caused by
immigration or moving from private to public school, we would see an increase in the 8th
to 10th grade enrollment change. If it were driven by an increase in the 9th grade dropout
rate or a decrease in the 10th grade dropout rate, we would see a decrease in the 8th to
10th grade enrollment change. Overall, these estimates show that 9th grade repeating more
than tripled from the 1960s to the late 1990s; the growth in 9th grade repeating is one of
the greatest educational trends of the past 50 years, and yet it has been largely ignored by
the economics literature.
5 Compulsory Schooling
5.1 Compulsory Schooling Law Effects on 9th Grade Repeating
The literature on the causes of the rise in 9th grade repeating is remarkably sparse; the
only study to posit potential causes, Haney et al. (2004) proposes three reasons why 9th
grade retention rose from the 1970s to the 2000s. First, states in the 1970s began tying
promotion to “minimum competency testing;” this tested students on basic reading and
arithmetic skills, and caused increases in both the dropout rate and 9th grade retention
rate (Kreitzer et al., 1989; Shepard and Smith, 1989). Second, academic requirements for
promotion and graduation were strengthened in the 1980s. Third, high-stakes testing tied
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promotion to performance on annual standardized tests.13
I argue that these institutional changes may have been the driving force behind the
growth in 9th grade retention, but that none of these changes would have caused such a
dramatic increase in retention without an external force preventing students from dropping
out of school. A 9th grader who is told he or she will be retained in the 9th grade for an
additional year would have a strong incentive to drop out of school, as they would be forced
to forgo an extra year in the labor market to achieve the same educational attainment as
their non-retained peers. Compulsory schooling laws make it illegal for these students to
leave school in the 9th grade – from 1965 to today, only two states (Arkansas and Missis-
sippi) ever had a minimum dropout age below 16, and after 1994 no state had a minimum
dropout age below 16.
A first-time 9th grader will typically enter the 9th grade at age 14, so a minimum dropout
age of 16 creates a binding enforcement mechanism that causes a retained 9th grader to ac-
tually repeat the 9th grade instead of dropping out of school. Although no on-track 9th
grader was legally allowed to drop out of school, in the 2004-2005 school year 9th grade
dropouts made up over 23% of all dropouts in the country (Sable et al., 2007). The existing
literature has ignored the role of compulsory schooling laws (CSLs) on 9th grade retention;
this is especially surprising, since there were many compulsory schooling law increases across
the country from the mid-1980s to mid-2000s, when the majority of the rise in 9th grade
retention occurred. Figure 3 shows the average minimum dropout age faced by an American
high school student from 1965 to 2014, calculated as the average dropout age across states,
weighted by state enrollment in grades 9-12.
13This is considered a separate change from minimum competency testing as high-stakes testing tests
students on skills appropriate for their grade level, while minimum competency testing tests far below grade
level.
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Figure 3 shows that the typical high schooler faced a minimum dropout age of 16.3-16.5
from 1965 to the mid-1980s. Over the next 20 years, the dropout age grew by about 1
year, peaking at 17.2 in 2005, then falling slightly to an average minimum dropout age of
17.1 today. Overall, states changed their minimum dropout age a total of 61 times in this
time period. The minimum dropout age is likely to continue to rise, as in President Barack
Obama’s 2012 State of the Union Address, he “call[ed] on every state to require that all
students stay in high school until they graduate or turn eighteen.”
I estimate the causal effect of changes in compulsory schooling laws on the 9th grade
retention rate using difference-in-differences estimation with the estimating equation below:
% Changes,t = β0 + β1Min Drop Ages,t + γt + λs + εs,t (6)
In equation 6, the % Changes,t refers to the 9th grade repeating rate estimate in state
s and year t, Min Drop Ages,t refers to the minimum dropout age in a state-year pair, and
λs and γt are state and year fixed effects, respectively. β1 is the coefficient of interest, the
causal effect of an increase in the minimum dropout age on 9th grade retention.14 This
specification has the advantage of being immune to between-cohort population changes. For
example, the large population growth in the West and South over the past 50 years does
not affect the level of the outcome variable. Given the regression specification, the standard
identifying assumption for difference-in-differences estimation applies: states not changing
their minimum dropout age have parallel trends in 9th grade retention to states changing
their minimum dropout age prior to the law change.
Table 4 shows the results from estimating equation 6. Columns (1) and (5) of Table 4
show that states with higher minimum dropout ages have greater 9th grade retention. In the
14This equation does not estimate the overall effect of compulsory schooling on 9th grade retention, as there
are no states without compulsory education. As a result, I am unable to test whether without compulsory
schooling laws, 9th grade retention would not exist.
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difference-in-differences specifications in columns (4) and (8), one extra year of compulsory
education increases the 9th grade retention rate by approximately 0.7 percentage points –
an 11.5% increase relative to the mean 9th grade retention rate of 6.1%.15 This suggests
that while the expansion of compulsory schooling laws is not entirely responsible for the
rise in 9th grade retention, compulsory schooling law changes still played an important role.
Continuing to raise the minimum dropout age may additionally erase the recent reductions
in 9th grade retention rates (from 11.4% in 1998 to 5.3% in 2012).
To test the identifying assumptions of the difference-in-differences model, I perform the
conventional event study-style test of lags and leads of compulsory schooling law changes. I
estimate the following model:
% Changes,t = α +
5∑
k=−5
βk 1(CSL Increaset+k) + γt + λs + εs,t (7)
In equation 7, the term 1(CSL Changet+k) is an indicator for an increase in the min-
imum dropout age in year t + k – states that change their minimum dropout age multiple
times within 5 years are omitted, as it is not possible to assign treatment status in this event
study structure for these states. This leaves 33 minimum dropout ages changes used to verify
the parallel trends assumption. The endpoints 1(CSL Increaset−5), 1(CSL Increaset+5)
are cumulative, meaning that all observations 5 or more years away from a CSL change are
assigned the same treatment status. Finally, βt−3 is normalized to 0. Figure 4 shows the
coefficient estimates {β−5, ..., β5} from the regression in equation 7.
Figure 4 shows no discernible pre-existing trends in the 9th grade retention rate, aside
from possibly a small deviation at (t − 5). Looking at the preferred 9th grade retention
15Standard errors are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust, as this (or clustering at the state-year pair,
which is equivalent) is conventional in the CSL literature (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Acemoglu and Angrist,
2000). Nevertheless, clustering may be appropriate – Table A1 in the Appendix compares standard errors
from robust standard errors, overlapped multiway clustered standard errors as in Cameron et al. (2011), and
standard errors clustered at the state level.
19
rate in Graph (b), Figure 4b shows a small, but noticeable increase in 9th grade retention,
corresponding to a reduction in the 9th-10th grade enrollment change, immediately upon
changing the minimum dropout age. This effect may only be temporary, as the coefficient
estimate reverts to its pre-law change level within 3-4 years, but if so, this temporary re-
duction is strong enough to cause a 0.7 percentage point increase in the 9th grade retention
rate on average.16
Next, I perform the same analysis to test for CSL effects on the change from 7th to 8th
grade, from 10th to 11th grade, and from 11th to 12th grade. Table 5 shows results from
estimation of equation 6 on these three outcomes. The change from 7th to 8th grade is a
placebo test, as CSLs should not have any effect on promotion from 7th to 8th grade. I
would see positive effects on the changes from 10th to 11th and from 11th to 12th grades if
CSLs prevent on-track high schoolers – that is, those who are promoted to the next grade –
from dropping out of school.
All 3 of the outcomes in Table 5 are unaffected by CSL changes. This is unsurprising
for the 7th to 8th grade enrollment change, but is somewhat unexpected for the other two
outcomes. CSLs are generally thought of as dropout prevention tools, and their use as
instruments in IV regressions of the returns to education hinges on the idea that CSLs, by
preventing teenagers from dropping out of school, increase educational attainment. Given
these findings, it is crucial to reexamine the validity of CSLs as instruments in the modern
era using data that allows observation of both educational attainment and grade repeating.
5.2 Correcting IV Estimates of the Returns to Education
Most publicly available microdata do not allow the researcher to observe repeated grades
in any form. However, some longitudinal surveys track each individual’s grade enrollment
16This temporary reduction may also be caused by states with multiple CSL changes in a short timespan
being dropped from the sample.
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in each year, allowing the observation of repeated grades. Other surveys ask a detailed his-
tory of grade repeating. For this analysis, I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 Children and Young Adults (CNLSY), which provides a wide time horizon, covering
individuals born between 1970 and 1999. In this period I observe a large number of CSL
changes – 28 states change their CSL in this time period. The CNLSY surveys individuals
biennially, but in each survey asks a history of grade repeating. Each individual who ever
reports having repeated the 9th grade is coded as a 9th grade repeater.17
Angrist and Krueger (1991) use quarter of birth as an instrument in their well-known
estimation of the effects of education on wages. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) modify this
instrument, using quarter of birth interacted with year of birth, and supplement this by
directly including compulsory education as an instrument.18 I replicate their methodology
in the CNLSY, estimating the private returns to education, beginning with the following
OLS estimating equation:
log(Wagei) =β0 + β1Ed Attainmenti + β2Rep 9thi + β3Blacki+
β4Hispanici + β5Femalei + λit + γis + εi
(8)
In equation 8, I modified Acemoglu and Angrist’s OLS estimation in two ways: first,
I included black, hispanic, and female individuals in the sample. This analyzes a different
population, thus resulting in a different local average treatment effect than that found by
Acemoglu and Angrist, but inclusion of these groups will estimate a LATE that is closer to
the population-level average treatment effect. Second, I control for whether an individual
repeated the 9th grade. In OLS estimation, this is unlikely to change the estimate of β1 by
17A small number of individuals may have repeated the 9th grade more than once; however, the question
asked in the CNLSY does not permit the observation of these multi-time repeaters.
18Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) note that related literature (e.g. Imbens and Angrist 1994) shows 3 quarter
of birth instruments cause the 2SLS estimate to be strongly biased toward the OLS estimate due to its 1st
stage weakness, while the quarter of birth interacted with year of birth produces estimates largely unaffected
by weak instrument bias.
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a significant amount. Selection bias caused by correlation between educational attainment
and grade repeating may exist, but the effect of grade repeating on wages is likely to be
quite small. I also control for state of residence γis and birth year λit, as in Acemoglu and
Angrist (2000).
OLS regressions provide a comparison for the 2SLS estimation of the effects of educational
attainment on wages. As 9th grade repeating is likely endogenous in equation 8, as is
educational attainment, I use compulsory schooling and/or quarter of birth as instruments for
both of these endogenous variables. Compulsory education instruments are three indicators
for each level of compulsory education, defined as CEis = Minimum Dropout Ages −
School Entry Ages for state s, with a minimum of CE = 9 and a maximum of CE = 12.
Quarter of birth is as in Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), with an indicator for quarter of birth
interacted with a year of birth fixed effect. The three 2SLS regression equations are given
below:
Ed Attainmenti =α0 + α1CEis + α2QOBi × λit + ηXi + ui
Rep 9thi =δ0 + δ1CEis + δ2QOBi × λit + ψXi + vi
(9)
log(Wagei) = β0 + β1 ̂Ed Attainmenti + β2 ̂Rep 9thi + ΓXi + εi (10)
The controls in Xi are identical to those in equation 8, except regressions with quarter
of birth instruments do not contain separate year of birth fixed effects due to collinearity.
I estimate the selection bias caused by CSL instruments by comparing βˆIV when correctly
accounting for 9th grade repeating to βˆIV when not accounting for 9th grade repeating.
Table 6 presents results from these regressions.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show comparisons of OLS to IV regressions ignoring 9th
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grade repeating. Panel A shows results for compulsory schooling law instruments – binary
indicators of the number of compulsory years of education in each state-year pair. Column
(2) shows a much larger effect of education on wages than the OLS estimate, typical for com-
pulsory schooling instruments as the local average treatment effect (LATE) is larger than the
average treatment effect, even with selection bias in the OLS case (see Imbens and Angrist
1994 for details). Columns (3) and (4) show comparisons of OLS to IV regressions accounting
for 9th grade repeating. Unfortunately, the 1st stage shows that these compulsory schooling
instruments are weak, with an F-statistic of only 3.4 when not accounting for 9th grade
repeating and 1.584 when accounting for 9th grade repeating. A comparison of column (2),
omitting 9th grade repeating, to column (4), including 9th grade repeating, shows that the
omission of 9th grade repeating from the model specification causes approximately 8% bias
in the returns to education.19
Panels B and C of Table 6 show results using quarter of birth instruments. I show that
quarter of birth instruments are strong as predictors of educational attainment, as asserted
by Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2000). This results in a slightly
smaller estimate than in Panel A, as weak instruments positively bias the IV estimate of
the returns to education. Including 9th grade repeating in the estimation, however, results
in a markedly lower estimate of the wage return to education. Although the instruments in
column (4) are weak, with an F-statistic of only 2.7, this should bias the return to education
upward, in the direction of OLS selection bias (Bound et al., 1995). Omission of 9th grade
repeating thus causes at least 38% bias in the estimate of the private wage return to educa-
tion when using quarter of birth instruments.
Inclusion of compulsory schooling law and quarter of birth instruments in Panel C reveals
a similar pattern – omission of 9th grade repeating in this specification causes 23% upward
19Point estimates in both column (2) and column (4) should both be upward biased due to instrument
weakness. However, I cannot determine which estimate faces larger bias.
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bias in estimation of the returns to education. Although the returns to repeating the 9th
grade are unbelievably high – it is unreasonable to think that repeating the 9th grade causes
wages to increase by 80-100% – this is the result of instrument weakness in predicting 9th
grade repeating, and suggests that, if anything, the estimate of the return to education is still
too large after accounting for 9th grade repeating. Weak instrument bias is in the direction
of OLS selection bias. OLS estimates of the returns to education face positive selection bias
from endogenous variables such as ability and household income, so IV estimates using weak
instruments will be positively biased. Overall, unless accounting for 9th grade repeating,
compulsory schooling instruments are invalid and create severe bias.
6 Repeated Grades and Experience
6.1 Black-White Wage and Hours Gaps
In this section, I consider how poor measurement of potential labor market experience
biases estimates of the black-white wage and employment gaps. To understand the channel
by which measurement error in experience biases these estimates, consider the regression
model estimated by Bound and Freeman (1992):
log(Wagei) = β0 + β1Blacki + αEd Attainmenti + γExperiencei + ηUrbani + εi (11)
The terms Ed Attainmenti and Experiencei are indicators for each level of educational
attainment and potential labor market experience, respectively. Potential labor market ex-
perience is calculated as min(Age−Ed Attainment− 6, Age− 18) to explicitly account for
selection into college attendance. However, repeated grades are not accounted for in this
measure of experience. The key consideration here is not that estimating equation 11 will
result in a biased estimate of γ, but rather that the primary coeffiecient of interest, β1, may
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be biased.
I use the NLSY97 to reexamine the early career black-white wage gap, accounting for
repeated grades. In the NLSY97, blacks are almost twice as likely as whites to have their po-
tential labor market experience misstated due to grade repeating; in 2010, 16% of whites and
31% of blacks had repeated at least one grade, causing Age−Ed Attainment−6 to overstate
their experience. Since experience has a positive effect on wages, systematically overstating
the level of experience for black workers more than for white workers will result in a residual
black-white wage gap that is too large. Some of the residual black-white wage gap estimated
by Bound and Freeman can likely be attributed to differences in repeating rates by race, not
to labor market discrimination. I replicate their regression model, but remeasure experience
as min(Age−Ed Attainment−Repeated Grades− 6, Age−Repeated Grades− 18) to ac-
curately measure potential labor market experience: that is, the number of years since each
individual completed their schooling. Table 7 reports results from estimating equation 11
and an analogous returns to employment regression for early career (2000-2005, ages 18-25)
and slightly later career (2006-2011, ages 22-31) workers.
In Panel A, column (1) finds a 21% gap between black and white wages, close to the 18%
estimate that Bound and Freeman find for workers in the 1980s. However, when controlling
for repeated grades in column (2), the gap closes by 2.4 percentage points; failing to account
for repeated grades overstates the residual black-white wage gap by 13% for early career
workers. Columns (3) and (4) show a similar pattern, with smaller bias in column (3). This
is due to 2 reasons: first, most college-educated workers in the sample begin entering the
labor force from 2006-2011, and college-educated workers of any race are unlikely to have
repeated grades. There is still a racial gap for college graduates, however; 14% of black
college graduates in the NLSY97 repeated a grade, while only 5% of white college gradu-
ates repeated a grade. The second, and likely more important reason for the smaller bias
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in column (3) is because mismeasurement in experience is less important for older workers.
In column (1), most individuals who repeated grades have their experience overstated by
25-100%. In column (3), since these workers now have 5-10 years of experience, experience
is overstated by only 10-20%. The bias caused by misstating experience is less important for
older workers, as it constitutes a smaller portion of their overall experience level.
Panel B shows no bias in the black-white employment gap caused by mismeasurement of
experience. This is because experience appears to have little effect on employment status.
The full set of experience indicators for the black-white wage gap and black-white employ-
ment gap are shown in Tables A2 and A3 – only two of the experience level indicators in
columns (1) or (3) are significantly different from the baseline level of 0 in Table A3. While
experience has large wage returns (8-10% per year), it has small employment returns (0.5%
per year), causing little to no bias in the black-white employment gap regressions. Repeated
grades are an important consideration in future estimation of black-white wage differentials.
The substantial correlation between grade repeating and race cause grade repeating to be
key in ensuring an unbiased estimate of the residual black-white wage gap.
6.2 Returns to GED
Grade repeating, as one might expect, is highly correlated with education. Table 8 shows
the proportion of individuals in the NLSY97 with each level of education who repeated at
least one grade in elementary and secondary school.
Cameron and Heckman (1993) estimate the returns to a GED in the NLSY79, finding
that the GED is not equivalent to a regular high school diploma, and that in fact GED
recipients are remarkably similar to high school dropouts who do not receive a GED. Table
8 confirms that this is true, showing that the grade repeating rate for GED recipients is
almost identical to that for high school dropouts. Overall, GED recipients’ repeating rates
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are 3.5 times as large as the repeating rates for high school graduates. The incredibly high
grade repeating rates of non-high school graduates cause substantial measurement error of
potential labor market experience when estimating wage and annual hours worked returns,
whether comparing high school graduates to GED recipients or to high school dropouts. I
estimate the bias caused by this measurement error in the NLSY97 by replicating the OLS
estimation of Cameron and Heckman (1993) as below:
log(Wagei) =β0 + β1GEDi + β2Dropouti + β3HS Diplomai + β4Associatesi
+ β5Experiencei + β6Urbani + β7Blacki + β8Hispanici + β9ASV ABi + εi
(12)
In equation 12, the primary variables of interest are the coefficients on educational at-
tainment, β1, β2, β3, and β4. I have set the baseline level of educational attainment as a
bachelor’s degree; this is unconventional, but is done to make coefficient estimates compara-
ble across specifications, regardless of whether I account for grade repeating or not. Since the
overall grade repeating rate is quite low for bachelor’s degree recipients (6.1%), the baseline
return to education will be largely unaffected by accounting for grade repeating. If I had
instead followed Cameron and Heckman (1993) and set high school dropouts as the base-
line, the coefficient estimates on high school diplomas and bachelor’s degrees would appear
biased, not the coefficient estimate on the GED. Here I follow the conventional potential
labor market experience measure, Experience = Age − Ed Attainment − 6, and correct
for grade repeating by letting Experience = Age − Ed Attainment − Grade Reps − 6.20
This regression only includes men, and has controls for urban status, race, and standardized
ASVAB score. Table 9 presents results from this estimation, with wages and hours worked
as outcomes.
20Cameron and Heckman (1993) use lifetime weeks worked as their primary experience measure. As men-
tioned previously, this measure is not subject to measurement error from repeated grades, but is endogenous
with factors influencing labor force participation, and is rarely used today.
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Panel A of Table 9 shows the effects of educational attainment on hourly wages. Column
(1) presents estimates with the conventional experience measure; high school graduates earn
14% less than college graduates, while GED recipients earn 37% less than college graduates –
a GED recipient earns 27% less than a high school diploma recipient, similar to the earnings
of a high school dropout. Column (2) shows the difference when only accounting for 9th
grade repeating – the wage penalty from a GED is reduced by 1 percentage point, but a
Chow test shows this difference is not significant. Column (3) shows the returns to a GED
when properly accounting for all repeated grades. The GED is still far less valuable than
a college degree and high school diploma, but the gap is smaller than in column (1). GED
recipients earn 32.7% less than college graduates, while high school graduates still earn 14%
less than college graduates; this makes the wage gap between GED recipients and high school
graduates only 22.2%, not 27% as suggested in column (1). A similar bias is present for high
school dropouts; estimates of the wage return to a GED are biased by 10.4% and estimates of
the wage return to dropping out of high school are biased by 10.9% when failing to account
for repeated grades. As a result, studies where the baseline educational attainment is chosen
as less than a high school diploma overstate the wage returns to completing high school.
Panel B shows the effects of educational attainment on annual hours worked. Cameron
and Heckman test annual hours worked to demonstrate that GED recipients are similar to
high school dropouts in their labor supply decisions on the intensive margin (hours worked
while employed).21 College graduates and high school graduates work similar hours; high
school graduates work only 2-3% fewer hours than college graduates in all 3 specifications.
However, GED recipients work far fewer hours than college and high school graduates. Col-
umn (1) shows a 16.2% labor supply gap between GED recipients and college graduates and
21This measure of annual hours worked also partially includes labor supply on the extensive margin.
It includes the decision to work a part-time or full-time job, as well as changes in employment status.
Observations of 0 hours worked in a year are dropped.
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a 20.4% gap between high school dropouts and college graduates. This translates to a 14%
gap between GED recipients and high school graduates and a 18.3% gap between high school
dropouts and high school graduates. However, accounting for repeated grades changes these
gaps substantially; accounting for 9th grade repeating reduces the labor supply gap for GED
recipients by 21%, and accounting for any repeated grade reduces the hours gap by an addi-
tional 10.7%. Overall, failure to account for repeated grades causes no bias in labor supply
estimation for high school graduates, but causes 33.9% bias in labor supply estimation for
GED recipients and 22.9% bias for high school dropouts. These findings suggest that while
the bias caused by grade repeating in OLS estimation of the returns to education may be
smaller than in IV estimation, it is still crucial to account for repeated grades in any estimate
of the returns to education.
6.3 Age as an Alternative Experience Measure
My results on the black-white wage gap and the returns to the GED demonstrate that the
conventional measure of potential labor market experience may bias estimates in the presence
of grade repeating. However, the ideal solution of directly accounting for repeated grades in
the construction of potential labor market experience is impossible in many datasets. The
Census, ACS, CPS, and other data sources do not measure grade repeating, so an alternative
measure of labor market experience is needed that is not affected by grade repeating.
I propose that researchers should simply control for age. Age is highly related to the
conventional measure of potential labor market experience (as it is perfectly collinear with
potential experience and educational attainment), but does not suffer from endogenous mea-
surement error. As a result, it can serve as a proxy variable for labor market experience
without being affected by repeated grades.
I test whether the inclusion of age can improve our estimates when grade repeating is
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unknown by comparing my previous estimates to estimates controlling for age in lieu of a
more conventional experience measure. Table 10 shows results from the black-white wage
and employment gaps. Here, rather than using the experience measure in Bound and Free-
man (1992), I use Age−Educational Attainment−6 and Age−Educational Attainment−
Repeated Grades−6.22 I compare these estimates to estimates when only controlling for age.
Columns (1) and (4) in Table 10 show the black-white wage and employment gaps us-
ing the conventional experience measure, and columns (3) and (6) show the gaps correcting
for repeated grades. Columns (2) and (5) control for age instead of potential labor mar-
ket experience. Controlling for age does not affect the estimate of the black-white wage or
employment gaps, relative to the conventional experience measure. None of the experience
measures cause statistically significant changes in the residual black-white wage gap esti-
mate, although the 13 to 14% difference between the wage gap in column (3) compared to
the gaps in columns (1) and (2) has economic significance. In estimation of the residual
black-white wage and employment gaps, age is no worse as a control than potential labor
market experience.
In Table 11, I test whether age reduces the bias in estimating the returns to the GED.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 11 are identical to columns (1) and (3) of Table 9, except
for the pairwise test statistics. Column (2) shows results controlling for age instead of a
conventional labor market experience measure. The wage return to the GED in Panel A
is significantly greater when controlling for age than when controlling for the conventional
labor market experience measure. Controlling for age results in a slightly greater estimate
of the wage return to the GED than controlling for experience and repeated grades, but this
different is not significant. Age improves the accuracy of the estimate of the wage return to
the GED, compared to the conventional measure of potential experience. Panel B shows a
22The point estimates and repeated grades bias when using this experience measure are almost identical
(18-20% black-white wage gap, 13% bias) to the previous estimates in Table 7.
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similar pattern to Panel A; controlling for age in estimating the labor supply gap between
GED recipients and high school graduates results in extremely low bias (6%), while control-
ling for potential labor market experience results in substantially greater bias (34%).
My findings suggest that researchers concerned about bias from repeated grades should,
at minimum, test whether the use of age in lieu of labor market experience affects point
estimates. When repeated grades cause small (e.g. black-white wage gaps) or no (e.g. black-
white employment gaps) bias, the use of age as a control variable should not affect the
estimate of interest. However, when repeated grades cause substantial bias (e.g. returns to
GED), the use of age improves the accuracy of the estimate of interest, and should be the
preferred proxy variable for labor market experience.
7 Conclusion
Repeated grades are an important, yet widely overlooked issue in the economics of edu-
cation. The tripling of 9th grade repeating rates from the 1970s to the late 1990s is of critical
importance to any researcher attempting to measure educational attainment or labor market
experience, but a lack of detailed data on grade repeating has caused much of the contem-
porary literature in labor economics to inadvertently introduce bias into their estimates.
Compulsory schooling instruments in particular have become less valid for individuals born
in the past 40 years. Efforts need to be made to circumvent their endogeneity with 9th grade
repeating. IV estimation of the returns to schooling can cause bias of at least 38% when
failing to account for the simultaneous effects of CSLs and/or quarter of birth on 9th grade
retention.
Similarly, a modification of the common experience measure, Experience = Age −
Educational Attainment − 6, is needed to avoid the accidental introduction of endoge-
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nous measurement error into related estimates. Failing to correctly measure potential labor
market experience causes 13% bias in the black-white wage gap for young workers, 10-11%
bias in the wage return to a GED or dropping out of high school, and 23-34% bias in the
labor supply gap for GED recipients and high school dropouts. All in all, these findings sug-
gest that solving this measurement error problem is crucial for future work, as any research
investigating people who finished their schooling in the 1980s, 1990s, or 2000s is subject to
this repeated grades problem.
Applied researchers must be cognizant of this measurement error problem and modify
their measure of experience to avoid bias. When using longitudinal data, such as the PSID
or NLSY, the solution is simple – grade repeating can be explicitly accounted for in the
measure of labor market experience and can be controlled for in the primary regression
model. However, when using cross-sectional data, the solution is more complicated. Age is
likely a better proxy for labor market experience than the conventional measure of Age −
Educational Attainment − 6, as it does not suffer from endogenous measurement error.
Controlling for age eliminates the bias in the returns to the GED, while not worsening the
bias in the black-white wage gap. I suggest that researchers using cross-sectional data should
control for age instead of experience, or at minimum, as a robustness test, to avoid bias from
repeated grades.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Enrollment Changes and Repeating Rates
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
% Change 7th - 8th -0.957 2.629 -23.54 25.31
% Change 8th - 9th 6.427 6.797 -16.35 47.10
% Change 9th - 10th -6.075 5.377 -38.16 19.00
% Change 10th - 11th -8.123 4.439 -28.75 19.79
% Change 11th - 12th -6.927 4.473 -27.53 18.48
CPS 9th Grade Rep. Rate (%) 3.651 6.882 0 100
Heubert and Hauser (1998) Repeating Rate 11.648 4.359 2.6 21.0
MA 1995-2012 Repeating Rate 7.533 0.747 5.7 8.5
Panel B: CNLSY
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Educational Attainment 12.348 1.910 8 20
Black 0.341 0.474 0 1
Female 0.559 0.497 0 1
Hispanic 0.204 0.403 0 1
9th Grade Repeaters 0.051 0.219 0 1
Compulsory Attendance (Years) 10.946 1.248 9 12
Age 23.204 4.196 15 42
(Continued on next page)
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Table 1: (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel C: NLSY97
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
GED 0.118 0.322 0 1
HS Diploma 0.466 0.499 0 1
HS Dropout (no GED) 0.0725 0.259 0 1
Associate’s Degree 0.0960 0.295 0 1
Bachelor’s Degree 0.248 0.432 0 1
9th Grade Repeats 0.0499 0.264 0 4
Any Grade Repeats 0.376 0.717 0 6
Urban Status 0.773 0.419 0 1
Black 0.211 0.408 0 1
Hispanic 0.195 0.396 0 1
Female 0.491 0.500 0 1
Age 23.02 5.549 14 34
Panel D: Minimum Dropout Age Frequency
Freq.
14 0.612
15 0.163
16 62.24
17 16.20
18 20.78
Notes: Enrollment changes in Panel A include all states and years from the 1965-66 academic year to the 2013-14
academic year. Other rates are described in the text. Panels B and C include all individuals in the CNLSY
and NLSY97, respectively, with valid educational attainment, state of residence, race, sex, and wage information.
Individuals with educational attainment less than 8 are omitted. Additionally, individuals who never provide a
valid grade repeating history are omitted. Panel D provides the frequencies of minimum dropout ages across all
state-year pairs in the United States (omitting AK, HI, and DC) from 1965-2014.
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Table 2: Pairwise Correlations, Repeating Rate Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
% Change % Change
8th-9th 9th-10th CPS
NRC & MA Rep. Rates 0.262 -0.392 0.084
p− value, ρ = 0 0.0143 0.0002 0.4873
Notes: P-values are shown for H0 : ρ = 0. The CPS correlation in column (3) has 24 fewer observations, due to the existence
of some NRC repeating rates before the introduction of the CPS October supplement in 1976.
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Table 3: Repeating Rate Estimates and True Repeating Rates
NRC & MA Repeating Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
9th-10th −0.877∗∗ −0.635∗∗
(0.0528) (0.156)
8th-9th 0.889∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.0662) (0.152)
CPS 1.31∗ 0.0166∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.164)
N 97 97 73 73
R2 0.74 0.65 0.44 0.79
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Significance stars test H0 : β = 1 or H0 : β = −1 for the appropriate estimate. The CPS regressions in columns (3) and
(4) have 24 fewer observations, due to the existence of some NRC repeating rates before the introduction of the CPS October
supplement in 1976.
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Table 4: CSL Effects on 9th Grade Retention
8th-9th Change 9th-10th Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dropout Age 2.707∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗ 2.844∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ -1.835∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ -1.927∗∗∗ -0.696∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.158) (0.207) (0.203) (0.144) (0.127) (0.146) (0.141)
State FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 2352 2352 2352 2352 2352 2352 2352 2352
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data on enrollment changes are from the NCES Annual Reports Program Historical Tables and CCD. All specifications
include dropout age as a continuous variable between 14 and 18. Regressions are robust to omitting state-year pairs with a
minimum dropout age below age 16 (< 1% of all state-year pairs) and to inclusion of indicators for each level of minimum
dropout age, 14 to 18.
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Table 5: CSL Effects on Non-9th Grade Promotion
(1) (2) (3)
% Change % Change % Change
7th - 8th 10th - 11th 11th - 12th
Dropout Age 0.0987 0.0717 0.0898
(0.0863) (0.107) (0.110)
Observations 2352 2352 2352
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data on enrollment changes are from the NCES Annual Reports Program Historical Tables and CCD. All specifications
include dropout age as a continuous variable between 14 and 18.
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Table 6: Compulsory Schooling Instruments with 9th Grade Repeating
Outcome = log(hourly wage)
No Repeat Control With Repeat Control
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Compulsory Schooling Law Instruments
Ed. Attainment 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.0594∗∗∗ 0.120∗
(0.00212) (0.0535) (0.00217) (0.0720)
9th Repeater -0.00558 -0.0599
(0.0160) (0.339)
K-P F-statistic [3.414] [1.584]
Panel B: Quarter×Year of Birth Instruments
Ed. Attainment 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0841∗∗∗
(0.00211) (0.00704) (0.00215) (0.00888)
9th Repeater 0.0328∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.165)
K-P F-statistic [37.875] [2.773]
Panel C: Quarter×Year of Birth and CSL Instruments
Ed. Attainment 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0935∗∗∗
(0.00211) (0.00695) (0.00215) (0.00789)
9th Repeater 0.0328∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.131)
K-P F-statistic [36.986] [2.898]
Observations 7511 7511 7511 7511
Robust errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the CNLSY. All regressions include controls for sex, race, and state of residence at age 16. Estimates
in Panel A control for year of birth. Year of birth is included in the set of instruments (along with quarter of birth) in Panels
B and C, and is not included in OLS estimates in Panels B and C.
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Table 7: Black-White Wage and Employment Gaps, Corrected for Repeating
2000-2005 2006-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Outcome = log(Wage)
Black -0.208∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0181) (0.0181)
Panel B: Outcome = Employment Status
Black -0.0921∗∗∗ -0.0929∗∗∗ -0.0627∗∗∗ -0.0618∗∗∗
(0.00978) (0.00976) (0.00769) (0.00769)
Account for
Repeating N Y N Y
N 8463 8463 13229 13229
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the NLSY97. All regressions include controls for educational attainment and urban status. Experience in
columns (1) and (3) is included as min(Age-Educational Attainment-6, Age-18). Experience in columns (2) and (4) is included
as min(Age-Educational Attainment-Repeated Grades-6, Age-Repeated Grades-18). Individuals enrolled in school are dropped
from these regressions, as well as women and non-white, non-black individuals.
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Table 8: Grade Repeating Rates by Educational Attainment
Repeating Rates in NLSY97 (%)
Dropouts GED HS Grads Associate’s Bachelor’s
9th Grade 16.4 18.4 1.3 1.5 <1
All Grades 72.6 73.6 21.1 16.8 6.1
Notes: Grade repeating rates by educational attainment are shown. Many individuals repeated multiple grades in their
academic careers; this is not displayed in this table, but is accounted for in my later analysis.
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Table 9: Wage and Labor Supply Returns to GED and HS Diploma, Corrected for Repeating
Experience Correction
(1) (2) (3)
9th Grade Any Grade
None Repeating Repeating
Panel A: Outcome = log(Hourly Wage)
GED -0.374∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0315) (0.0330)
Dropout -0.436∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗
(0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0396)
HS Grad -0.139∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193)
Chow Test χ2: GED=(1) 1.41 11.68∗∗∗
Chow Test χ2: GED=(2) 5.51∗∗
Panel B: Outcome = log(Annual Hours Worked)
GED -0.162∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0247) (0.0259)
Dropout -0.204∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗
(0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0311)
HS Grad -0.0259∗ -0.0260∗ -0.0218
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0152)
Chow Test χ2: GED=(1) 8.75∗∗∗ 12.74∗∗∗
Chow Test χ2: GED=(2) 1.01
N 7956 7956 7956
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Baseline educational attainment is a college diploma, as repeating rates are lowest (6%) for college graduates – this
makes each column comparable. All coefficient estimates should be interpreted as the return relative to a college diploma.
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Table 10: Black-White Wage and Employment Gaps, Experience and Age
2000-2005 2006-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Outcome = log(Wage)
Black -0.198∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
(0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0187)
Panel B: Outcome = Employment Status
Black -0.104∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0540∗∗∗ -0.0531∗∗∗
(0.00948) (0.00948) (0.00947) (0.00799) (0.00799) (0.00800)
Experience Control Standard Age Std. + Reps. Standard Age Std. + Reps.
N 9003 9003 9003 12240 12240 12240
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the NLSY97. All regressions include controls for educational attainment and urban status. Experience
in columns (1) and (4) is included as Age-Educational Attainment-6. Column (2) controls for Age instead of Experience.
Experience in columns (3) and (6) is included as Age-Educational Attainment-Repeated Grades-6. Individuals enrolled in
school are dropped from these regressions, as well as women and non-white, non-black individuals.
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Table 11: Wage and Labor Supply Returns to GED and HS Diploma, Experience and Age
Experience Control
(1) (2) (3)
Standard
Standard Age + Reps.
Panel A: Outcome = log(Hourly Wage)
GED -0.374∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0285) (0.0330)
Dropout -0.436∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗
(0.0379) (0.0357) (0.0396)
HS Grad -0.139∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193)
Chow Test χ2: GED=(1) 44.00∗∗∗ 11.68∗∗∗
Chow Test χ2: GED=(2) 2.37
Panel B: Outcome = log(Annual Hours Worked)
GED -0.162∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0224) (0.0259)
Dropout -0.204∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗
(0.0297) (0.0281) (0.0311)
HS Grad -0.0259∗ -0.0263∗ -0.0218
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0152)
Chow Test χ2: GED=(1) 14.24∗∗∗ 12.74∗∗∗
Chow Test χ2: GED=(2) 0.22
N 7956 7956 7956
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Baseline educational attainment is a college diploma, as repeating rates are lowest (6%) for college graduates – this
makes each column comparable. All coefficient estimates should be interpreted as the return relative to a college diploma.
Column (1) uses the conventional potential experience measure (Age-Educational Attainment-6) and is identical to column
(1) of Table 9. Column (2) controls for age instead of experience. Column (3) accounts for repeated grades in the potential
experience measure (Age-Educational Attainment-Repeated Grades-6) and controls for repeated grades; it is identical to column
(3) of Table 9.
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Figure 1: US Total Enrollment by Grade, 1977 & 2014 Graduation Cohorts
(a) 1977 Graduation Cohort
(b) 2014 Graduation Cohort
Notes: Enrollment data are from the NCES Annual Reports Historical Tables (a) and the NCES Common Core of Data (b).
Both graphs show enrollment by projected graduation cohort. Graph (a) shows national 1st grade enrollment in the 1965-66
AY, 2nd grade enrollment in the 1966-67 AY, etc., ending with 12th grade enrollment in the 1976-77 AY.
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Figure 2: 9th Grade Repeating Rate Changes, 1965-2014
Notes: Enrollment data are from the NCES Annual Reports Historical Tables (1965-2003) and the NCES Common Core of
Data (2004-2014). The “Year in 9th Grade” denotes in which October each cohort is enrolled in the 9th grade. All three lines
are directly comparable at the cohort level; for year 1980, the % Change 8th-9th shows the enrollment change between 8th
grade in AY 1979-80 and 9th grade in AY 1980-81, the % Change 9th-10th shows the enrollment change between 9th grade in
AY 1980-81 and 10th grade in AY 1981-82, and the % Change 8th-10th shows the enrollment change between 8th grade in AY
1979-80 and 10th grade in AY 1981-82.
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Figure 3: Minimum Dropout Age, 1965-2014
Notes: Average minimum dropout age, weighted by state high school enrollment (9th-12th grades) is shown from 1965-2014.
Minimum dropout ages are taken from Oreopoulos (2006) for 1965-2005 and from Mackey and Duncan (2013) for 2005-2014.
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Figure 4: Event Study, CSL Effects on 9th Grade Retention
(a) % Change 8th-9th
(b) % Change 9th-10th
Notes: Both graphs show the coefficients from estimation of the dynamic difference-in-differences model in 7. Graph (a) shows
coefficients with the enrollment change from 8th to 9th grade as the outcome variable, and graph (b) shows coefficients with the
enrollment change from 9th to 10th grade as the outcome variable. The year that a minimum dropout age changes is denoted
as t = 0. States that change the minimum dropout age multiple times within 5 years are omitted in both figures. Coefficient
estimates are relative to the baseline of 0 at t = −3, 3 years before a minimum dropout age change.
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Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
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Table A1: CSL Effects on 9th Grade Retention, Clustering
% Change 9th - 10th
2-Way Clustering, 3-Way Clustering,
Robust 2 years per cluster 3 years per cluster State Clustering
Dropout Age -0.696∗∗∗ -0.696∗∗∗ -0.696∗∗ -0.696
(0.141) (0.232) (0.278) (0.421)
Observations 2352 2352 2352 2352
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: N -Way clustering in columns (2) and (3) refers to overlapping, but non-nested clustering over time horizons of size
N in a state as in Cameron et al. (2011). For example, 2-way clustering allows for serial correlation between consecutive years
within a state, but does not allow for direct correlation between year t and year t+ 2 in a state; year t and t+ 2 are assumed
to only be correlated through the pairwise correlations of t and t+ 1, and t+ 1 and t+ 2.
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Table A2: Black-White Residual Wage Gap, Returns to Experience
2000-2005 2006-2011
Black -0.208∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0181) (0.0181)
Exp. = 1 0.204∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.0832 0.0828
(0.0487) (0.0419) (0.0767) (0.0743)
Exp. = 2 0.451∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.0484) (0.0418) (0.0714) (0.0688)
Exp. = 3 0.601∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.0497) (0.0434) (0.0696) (0.0671)
Exp. = 4 0.734∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(0.0514) (0.0463) (0.0693) (0.0667)
Exp. = 5 0.738∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(0.0561) (0.0691) (0.0665)
Exp. = 6 0.776∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗
(0.0629) (0.0583) (0.0697) (0.0673)
Exp. = 7 0.869∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗
(0.0761) (0.0974) (0.0701) (0.0676)
Exp. = 8 0.880∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗
(0.0708) (0.0684)
Exp. = 9 0.917∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗
(0.0715) (0.0696)
Exp. = 10 0.917∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗
(0.0732) (0.0734)
Account for
Repeating N Y N Y
N 3874 3874 8430 8430
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the NLSY97. All regressions include controls for educational attainment and urban status. Experience in
columns (1) and (3) is included as min(Age-Educational Attainment-6, Age-18). Experience in columns (2) and (4) is included
as min(Age-Educational Attainment-Repeated Grades-6, Age-Repeated Grades-18). Individuals enrolled in school are dropped
from these regressions, as well as women and non-white, non-black individuals.
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Table A3: Black-White Residual Employment Gap, Returns to Experience
Outcome = Employment Status
2000-2005 2006-2011
Black -0.0921∗∗∗ -0.0929∗∗∗ -0.0627∗∗∗ -0.0618∗∗∗
(0.00978) (0.00976) (0.00769) (0.00769)
Exp. = 1 -0.0114 -0.0169 0.00366 0.00459
(0.0155) (0.0135) (0.0236) (0.0234)
Exp. = 2 -0.00568 -0.0000431 0.000762 0.0166
(0.0156) (0.0139) (0.0225) (0.0219)
Exp. = 3 -0.0185 -0.0294∗ 0.0216 0.0272
(0.0166) (0.0153) (0.0216) (0.0213)
Exp. = 4 -0.0321∗ -0.0340∗ 0.00647 0.0358∗
(0.0182) (0.0174) (0.0215) (0.0211)
Exp. = 5 -0.0214 -0.0344∗ 0.0301 0.0399∗
(0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0214) (0.0211)
Exp. = 6 -0.0155 -0.0515∗∗ 0.0294 0.0486∗∗
(0.0237) (0.0262) (0.0217) (0.0213)
Exp. = 7 0.000300 0.0610∗ 0.0376∗ 0.0488∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0364) (0.0220) (0.0217)
Exp. = 8 0.0327 0.0534∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0221)
Exp. = 9 0.0357 0.0556∗∗
(0.0230) (0.0231)
Exp. = 10 0.0331 0.0572∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0256)
Account for
Repeating N Y N Y
N 8463 8463 13229 13229
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the NLSY97. All regressions include controls for educational attainment and urban status. Experience in
columns (1) and (3) is included as min(Age-Educational Attainment-6, Age-18). Experience in columns (2) and (4) is included
as min(Age-Educational Attainment-Repeated Grades-6, Age-Repeated Grades-18). Individuals enrolled in school are dropped
from these regressions, as well as women and non-white, non-black individuals.
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